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< Back Life ‘After’ the Pandemic: Ethiopia’s Response to COVID-19’s Paradoxical Effect 15 June 2021 Naol Befkadu It is a conspicuous fact that the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in worldwide lockdowns. But before COVID-19 caused forced lockdowns, Ethiopia was already in a fragile economic state. Moreover, beneath its shaky economic state, the country was fracturing along ethnic and political lines. COVID-19 was not just bad news for the country, it was more like a typhoon or a thunderstorm fast destroying an already fractured building. Both as an ordinary Ethiopian and a medical professional, looking back at the effects of the pandemic on the country, I am left with conflicting views. One is that the supposedly coming typhoon did not happen as was expected, medically speaking, at least as compared to the West and now, the East. Intense restrictions did not last more than six months. Schools opened and government employees returned to their normal work schedules sooner than many nations. Ethiopians started talking about the lockdown as ‘during COVID-19’ and the current time as ‘after covid’ as in, a post-covid era. I work in Tikur Anbessa Specialized Hospital, the largest hospital in the country, which returned to its full function long before vaccines arrived in Ethiopia. Just after the pandemic began, our wards were evacuated and we were told to treat patients via telemedicine. Our medical school, which is by far the largest medical school in the country in terms of both staff and students, was closed two weeks after the onset of the pandemic in the country. We expected nothing less than a plague. Fear and anxiety surfaced within the hospital leadership and our senior physicians. Well, this too didn’t last more than six months—from April to August 2020. Our hospital returned to its full function, the medical school was opened and life continued just as it had before the pandemic, only with a few measures such as wearing masks and using hand sanitizers. Life post-covid seemed to be happening. The other observation I would like to make is that in other aspects, the consequences of the pandemic on the country were astoundingly immense. Although the people did not feel the medical effect of the pandemic as in the Western world or in Asia, the effect of the pandemic was beyond description when other aspects of life are considered. We felt as if the pandemic had mercy on us, but ‘life post-pandemic’ was nothing but a defense mechanism to conceal the damage and the challenges the pandemic posed for the individual as well as for the socio-economic and political situation in the country. This article is a summary of how Ethiopia responded to the pandemic both from a medical perspective and from social, economic and political perspectives. The Ethiopian Ministry of Health and the COVID-19 Pandemic It was shortly after her appointment that Dr. Lia Tadesse, the State Minister of Health, was faced with one of the deadliest pandemics in history. Dr. Lia, specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, succeeded Dr. Amir Aman, at the time the youngest minister to lead Ethiopia’s Ministry of Health, which takes “Healthier Citizens for a Prosperous Nation” as its motto. When the first case was announced on March 13, 2020, Dr. Lia became the headline of local and national television news. Since then she and the office she runs have been updating the daily cases of COVID-19 in the country. [1] Tikur Anbesa Street, Addis Ababa When the first case was announced by the then mayor of Addis, Takele Uma, the news was disturbing to all of us, especially to the residents of Addis Ababa. The city was gripped by a huge fear and depression. Everyone started rushing home. Parents went to schools and nurseries to take their kids home. Government employees stopped their jobs and returned home. I remember being in a seminar with Professor Amha Mekasha at our hospital when the news of the pandemic was announced. Prof. Amha was presenting on the challenges of medical leadership and facilities in Ethiopia. Before he finished his presentation, he took questions from the podium. One of the participants raised his hand and said, “Sir, COVID-19 is in the country!” We all laughed but at the same time we were shocked by the alarm. COVID-19, as if a guest to be welcomed, was in the country already! Immediately on the same day, the prices of surgical masks rose from US$0.15 (5 ETB) to US$6.25 (208 ETB), a 4000% increase within hours. The situation was worrying after an image of people queuing to buy masks appeared on social media. With the rise in the price of medical equipment, economic inflation increased significantly in less than 24 hours. The value of vegetables and cereal showed 20% inflation. Increases are expected in such times, but not that high. The government immediately established a rapid COVID-19 Response Committee to quickly solve inflation and to distribute medical equipment. Within two weeks, schools were closed and working hours for government employees went from eight hours a day to six, with occasional days off and even whole weeks off. Initially, COVID-19 tests were administered at Bole airport after passengers arrived in Addis. That was how the first two cases were found. Testing was limited to the airport because it was thought that the only gateway for the virus was through air travel from countries that were already infected. A month after the first case was found, COVID-19 testing began in border areas, especially at the Djibouti-Ethiopian border where many cases were found. At the beginning, patients were admitted to Eka COVID-19 Hospital, which the Ministry of Health dedicated exclusively to COVID-19 cases. Later, Millennium Hall, the country’s largest public gathering place, was converted into a Covid center holding more than 1000 beds and an ICU with 10 mechanical ventilators. (Fascinating to many, the country had only 400 mechanical ventilators in total.) It is worth remembering that Ethiopia ranked 99 out of 103 on the UNDP Human Poverty Index. Ethiopia is one of Africa’s poorest states, with 45% of its 77 million people living below the poverty line. Hence, the only way the country could handle the crisis was through prevention. I believe that it is fair to conclude that the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) did an immense job in the health education and promotion, both in cities and rural areas in the country. Other health organizations also helped in educating people to prevent the disease. For example, the Oromia Physician Association (OPA) regularly held rallies (with social distancing) and other events to educate the people, especially those in the countryside, about how to prevent COVID-19 especially in Oromia, the largest region of the country where Addis Ababa, the capital city is located. In other parts of the country many public actors such as educators and influential people urged the people to take seriously the measures to prevent the disease. People Crossing the Roads in Addis Ababa The rapid response committee that was set up by the Prime Minister’s office soon established rules and restrictions that were supposed to be implemented by the police. Following the restrictions, all public gatherings of more than 50 people were banned. Nightclubs and public entertainment places were shut down (with religious people making an obvious commentary on this restriction as being ‘God’s hand’). Masks were mandatory outside of the house or there would be punishment. Religious gatherings were also prohibited. Mosques and churches were closed. Even the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the largest denomination in Ethiopia with over 40 million members, shut its cathedral in fear of the pandemic. Knowing the rules and regulations alone would not affect the population, many artists also gathered to make videos and music to teach people to prevent the virus and to stay at home. Religious singers also sang and taught people to stay at home. This is done mainly in Amharic language, the official Federal language of Ethiopia. But government officials, artists and other popular figures also regularly presented on television and on different media in Oromo and other languages to educate the people about the pandemic. The COVID-19 response team also managed and oversaw any unfair increase in the value of goods, especially in the city. The government was able to collect donations from local and international charity organizations. Religious ministries and parachurch organizations were able to collect cash and goods from their respective members and distribute them to the most vulnerable people and groups who were severely affected by the pandemic. While the health promotion and education was carried out by many public actors, as mentioned above, the country’s less than twenty thousand physicians were being trained online by the Ministry of Health in Covid Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) and clinical management of Covid cases. As the disease progressed, every region set up its own Covid center. For a better description of the effects of COVID-19 from a medical perspective, I will use figures related to COVID-19 cases during the initial months and in various places. Bear with me. On Sunday April 5, 2020, 23 days after the first case was announced, Dr. Lia announced the first Covid related deaths in the country. At that time Ethiopia’s testing was limited to travellers passing through Bole airport. Hence, almost all of the reported cases had a travel history to or from a country that had high Covid cases. Very few cases had no travel history. By the end of April there had been 105 new cases, bringing the total number of confirmed cases to 131. The death toll was 3. The number of recovered patients increased to 59, leaving 69 active cases. [2] This was very low compared to other countries at that time. For example, in neighboring Kenya, the number of confirmed cases had reached 396 by the end of April. There had been 17 fatalities while 144 patients had recovered, leaving 235 active cases at the end of the month. One thing to note here is that there wasn’t a significant testing difference between Ethiopia and Kenya at that point. Ethiopia has the third busiest airport in Africa, with around 6 million passengers in 2020 alone, followed by Egypt and South Africa who registered 5,537 and 5,647 total Covid cases respectively at the end of April 2020. One can say Ethiopia did a very good job in preventing the disease during this phase of the pandemic. However, the testing abilities of both Egypt and South Africa were far better than Ethiopia during this time. For most of 2020, the medical burden of the pandemic was not as huge as was expected. At the end of December 2020, the total number of confirmed cases reached 124,264. The death toll rose to 1,923. The number of recovered patients increased to 112,096, leaving 10,245 active cases at the end of the month. Ethiopia’s testing ability had also grown to 7000 people daily. In total, 1.8 million people were tested by the end of December 2020. 10, 245 active cases were managed both at Addis Ababa’s largest Covid center at Millennium hall and Eka Hospital and also at regional hospitals. Private hospitals also offered Covid treatment with a cost that was 100 times higher than the government hospitals. For example, patients who were treated at Hallelujah Hospital, a well-known private hospital in Addis Ababa, were asked for as much as 200,000 ETB (around $5,000) for their hospital stay, while government hospitals charged not more than 1,000 ETB ($25) in total. Since the country follows a mixed economic system, private hospitals are free to charge any amount. Following the ‘low’ infection progress of the disease, schools and universities were re-opened in October and November 2020. Life ‘after’ COVID-19 seemed to be underway. Government employees’ working hours were back to normal by early September. Many restrictions that were imposed by the COVID-19 Response Committee were lifted. Masks became non-mandatory and even government officials stopped wearing masks at gatherings. Public gatherings with more than 50 people were allowed once again. Churches and Mosques were opened. Theatres and cinemas returned to their ‘normal’ state. Nightclubs and other restricted entertainment places opened up again. To many, it seemed that Covid was just flu. Life continued. 2021: What’s New? The infection was expected to follow a similar course in 2021. At the beginning of 2021, this seemed to be the case, with an average of 400 daily cases out of an average 5000 people tested. The number of new cases in January 2021 (13,386) was a little less than in December 2020 (14,190). However, from February to April 2021, the number of cases and COVID-19 related deaths peaked. The table below summarizes the total COVID-19 cases and deaths from February to May 2021. From February to May 2021, the average daily testing was around 5,000 people with daily cases on average 1,500 to 2000 people. The graph seems to go down once again in the month of May, returning to January levels. At the time of writing of this article (June 2021), the average daily testing was nearly the same (5,000 to 6,000) and daily recorded COVID-19 cases were between 300 and 500. Vaccination Campaigns On March 13, 2021, Ethiopia launched a COVID-19 vaccination campaign. [3] The Ministry of Health launched the COVID-19 vaccine drive in a high-level national event held at Eka Kotebe COVID-19 Hospital where frontline health workers were vaccinated to mark the beginning of the vaccination campaign. Following this, health professionals, government officials and influential people received the vaccine. [i] WHO Africa, 2020. https://www.afro.who.int/news/ethiopia-introduces-covid-19-vaccine-national-launching-ceremony (accessed on June 7, 2021) View of Addis Ababa from Mount. Entoto The AstraZeneca vaccine produced by Serum Institute of India (SII) arrived in Ethiopia on March 6, 2021, through COVAX, which facilitated the procurement and shipment of the vaccines. It has been said that in total 7.62 million doses will be shipped to Ethiopia. China also donated over 300,000 doses of the coronavirus vaccine developed by Sinopharm to Ethiopia. It has been said that China has been donating vaccines to 80 developing countries in urgent need, and has provided support under the COVAX global vaccine-sharing scheme. The AstraZeneca vaccines were distributed to every region in the country since they arrived in huge numbers as compared to China’s Sinopharm. Although different studies surrounding the AstraZeneca vaccine say different things, the WHO has been recommending it. Hence, the Ministry of Health did not ban the vaccine from the country. The physicians and medical students at Tikur Anbessa Hospital were among the first groups in the country to take the vaccine. There was a fear as to how our bodies would react to the vaccine, due to a few people getting very sick after getting vaccinated. Myalgia (muscle pain), headache and other side effects were expected. However, thankfully we didn’t encounter severe reactions. In fact the huge challenge to the vaccination campaign did not come from medical studies related to the COVAX vaccines, but rather it originated in religious beliefs and conspiracy theories. Some believed that the vaccines had microchips inside of them which were thought to implant ‘the mark of the beast’. Other conspiracies include the belief that the vaccines were to be used by the West to enslave black people. Some are still saying that the vaccines were intended to limit the number of black people by causing infertility. Challenges to Full Scale Prevention and Control of the Pandemic Of course, since March 13, 2020, when the first positive case was announced, the pandemic has not been without its challenges. We can group the challenges faced in Ethiopia into three categories: the first is related to material and logistical issues. The second is related to the government’s implementation of the rules and restrictions set by the COVID-19 Response Committee. The third is related to popular beliefs and practices. With regards to the first challenge, as described earlier, Ethiopia is ranked among the countries with the worst medical resources. The country does not have the equipment to handle its 115 million citizens, who make it the second most populous country in Africa. The effect of this challenge was seen especially recently (Feb-April 2021) when there was a surge in COVID-19 cases. Critically ill patients were beyond the capabilities of the government hospitals and ICUs. Most patients couldn’t afford to be treated in private hospitals; hence, sadly the critically ill were left without help. Many deaths recorded in those three months have been attributed to this factor. Secondly, the government’s implementation of the COVID-19 related restrictions and laws did not have an entirely positive impact. For example, only a few months after the first COVID-19 cases were announced, the government postponed the election that was to take place in June 2020. This created huge doubts and concerns—especially among those in the countryside—that the disease was fabricated by the government so as to postpone the elections. This became a popular belief in rural areas especially in the Oromia region where a huge contest in the election was expected. On the other hand, the government also fell into the trap of immature and unscientific research, when it claimed through its Ministry of Science and Innovation that they had discovered the cure for COVID-19. [4] This was televised on national television channels and the people received the news gladly. However, the government couldn’t handle its findings leaving the people to take the ‘innovations’ as nothing more than a hoax. The other problem was that government officials themselves did not set good examples to their people with regards to keeping social distance and wearing masks. A photo of Takele Uma, the State Minister of Energy and Mines, went viral on social media. In the photograph, Takele Uma was the only person not wearing a mask, alongside five, mostly foreign nationals, who were all wearing masks. Other ministers and regional presidents appeared publicly without a mask or even held party rallies or meetings without social distancing measures. Thirdly, popular beliefs, originating in religion or myths, were also a hindrance to the collective effort of fighting against the pandemic. For example, in the earliest days most people believed that covid-19 was God’s punishment and if we returned to God the virus would disappear. The government gave free airtime to religious programs on national television every day. This is not just a spiritual explanation to a natural phenomenon, it was a spiritual solution to a natural phenomenon meaning that rather than believing in the preventive measures, people drew conclusions that religious dedications or other means would cure or keep the virus away. Incense was burnt on the streets and their smoke was delivered from trucks all over the city by Ethiopian Orthodox Church followers. Some protestant ministers especially those who claimed to be ‘faith healers’ sold ointments that would keep the virus away. Not only religious beliefs but also traditional myths were propagated by many people. Some believed that white onions would keep the virus away which resulted in the value of white onions skyrocketing. Further complicating the challenges were lower daily COVID-19 case numbers as compared to other countries. Everyone interpreted the lower cases and death rates in their own way. It is common to hear terms such as “government propaganda,” “God’s mercy,” and “God’s judgment” used to describe COVID-19. The Non-Medical Side Effects of COVID-19 in Ethiopia Alongside, or even more so than the medical burden, COVID-19 has affected the lives of Ethiopians in many other aspects. Just as it is true in many places around the world, COVID-19 affected Ethiopia in social, economic and political terms. Impact on Social Life Ethiopia is comprised of many ethno-linguistic groups most of whom can be described as having tight cultures. Mike Rainer, former Ambassador of the U.S.A to Ethiopia, described Northern Ethiopia’s culture as “uncompromising.” What he seems to be referring to is that societal ties and structures especially in Northern Ethiopia, which is dominated by Christians, do not easily welcome or adapt to the ‘foreign’ or the ‘strange’. The same is true for the Somali and other primarily Muslim cultures in Ethiopia who are characteristically described as having tight cultures. When the telephone was introduced in Ethiopia in the early 20th century, people denounced it saying it was a means of talking with Satan. Anyone who was seen talking on the telephone, including the then Emperor, was seen as talking with Satan. It took some time for the laymen and women to be convinced that telephones were not instruments of the devil. This is just one example. Many of our stories speak to the fact that Ethiopians are not early-adopters of a new thing, nor do we easily change our old traditions for something new. It is customary in Ethiopia, across its cultures, for people to hug one another when they greet. In some places, such as in Silte and Haddiyya, people hug more than three times in one greeting. While in the north they hug twice when they greet. Somalis and other Muslim cultures kiss each other’s hands. Touching one another during greeting is seen as honoring the other person. COVID-19 came to break this culture with social distancing. This cultural change was not accepted, as was to be expected. With conspiracies acting as fuel, many people in the countryside refused to give up this custom. People continued to shake hands and kiss cheeks and hands even after social distancing was announced. People waiting for bus in Addis AbabaPhoto by Medhanit A Moreover, social distancing did not seem realistic on some occasions. Looking at the cases of the polygamous groups in our country, social distancing was perceived not only as unrealistic but also offensive. 11% of married women in Ethiopia are involved in polygamous marriages, meaning their husbands have more than one wife. [5] A polygamous father could have as many as 50 children all mostly living under one roof. How can social distancing be implemented in such scenarios? How could a father be distanced from his children, or siblings distanced from each other? This might seem an exaggerated case but it is very real and was often faced. The case for the homeless is also another difficult sociological issue that was faced following the COVID-19 epidemic. There are more than 50,000 homeless people in Addis Ababa, most of whom are between the ages of 15 and 25. [6] Their lives are based on the streets where they beg and sleep. With the lockdown, the fate of these people was in question. The city mayor had already planned to move the homeless young people into a sanctuary where they would get the chance to get educated and trained in order to find a job. Some of those who passed through the process were able to find a job. However, treating all 50,000 homeless individuals, whose numbers increased daily, was a huge task for a country that ranks among the poorest on earth. Of all the groups that were affected by the pandemic, commercial sex workers based in Addis Ababa were the most severely affected. Prostitution is legal in Ethiopia and UNAIDS’s 2016 report revealed that there are around 19,000 commercial sex workers across major cities in Ethiopia, most of whom reside in Addis Ababa. [7] Following the pandemic many of those who work in prostitution lost their clients because of the lockdown. Charity groups, NGOs and FBOs were involved in reaching out to this population. However, since restrictions eased in September 2020, things seems to have returned to normal. At the time of writing this, the sex business in Addis Ababa is fully back with nightclubs, bars, restaurants and pensions once again fully functional. The commercial sex business also received many additional workers, with the return of many citizens who had migrated to Saudi Arabia. The returnees had lost their jobs because of the pandemic and most of the women were forced to enter into the commercial sex trade. [8] It seems that, foreseeing the huge economic crisis that was about to occur in a country of 115 million inhabitants, many chose to believe conspiracies, myths, pseudoscience or their traditions rather than committing themselves to the measures of prevention and control. This paved the way for the wrongly held, ‘life after COVID-19’ belief. The government’s mishandling of the issue also played an important role in aggravating this belief. The Economic Impact The other facet of the effect of Covid was economic. Ethiopia has been among the fastest growing countries in the world for the past decade. Even during the climax of the countrywide protests, Ethiopia maintained a growth rate of 7.7 as per the report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). [9] That seems to account for why the United Nations report on the impact of the pandemic on Ethiopia starts by acknowledging the country’s ability to maintain economic stability in spite of different challenges encountered over the years. [10] Practically speaking, the pandemic did hurt the country’s economy, and different groups were hit by the pandemic to different extents. The first days of the pandemic showed a marked increase in the value of goods. The Addis Ababa city government as well as the COVID-19 Response Committee tried to stabilize the inflation by taking several measures, the main one being penalizing stores that unfairly increased prices. Since the country follows a mixed economic model, the government had the mandate and the right to stabilize and set market values. This went in favor of the masses in most cases. During inflation seasons, the government intervenes to maintain the economy. Nonetheless, the government’s intervention does not reach all groups. The government’s economic interventions mostly focus on the urban areas particularly Addis Ababa, which has the lion’s share of the country’s market. While Addis Ababa was getting the government’s help over unfair increases of necessary goods by some business owners, other cities and rural areas did not get the government’s help immediately. This was because Addis Ababa took all the attention in the country because of the high rate of COVID-19 cases compared to other towns, with the exception of Dire Dawa, which had also displayed a higher infection rate due to migrants returning home from the nearby Djibouti city. Even in Addis Ababa, not all groups were affected by the pandemic similarly. While the government tried to maintain the economy for working class citizens, the jobless, immigrants and other businesses such as the commercial sex business and entertainment businesses were also highly affected. In order to maintain employment levels, the government’s COVID-19 Response Committee passed a regulation that prevented business owners from firing any of their employees until the COVID-19 State of Emergency was lifted. The State of Emergency (SOE), overseen by the COVID-19 Response Committee, lasted from April to August, totaling five months. This helped citizens working for private companies. The regulations also included the prohibition of rent increases and evictions until the end of the SOE. In the meantime, Ethiopia faced not only the pandemic in 2020 but also a desert locus invasion. The locust invasion has been the worst in 25 years, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It damaged an estimated 200,000 hectares (490,000 acres) of land between January and October 2020, threatening food supplies. To better understand the significance, a single square-kilometer swarm can eat as much food in a day as 35,000 people. It was no less than a miracle to read the World Bank’s report on Ethiopia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, which had slowed down to 6.1% in 2019/20 due to the pandemic. However, the country was still among the top growing economies in Africa and in the world. The World Bank’s account states that industry, mainly construction, and services accounted for most of the growth. In the meantime agriculture was not affected by the pandemic and, astoundingly enough, its contribution to growth slightly improved in 2019/20 compared to the previous year. At the time of this writing, the value of some goods have increased, or in some instances doubled, compared to just over a year ago. For example, one pack of pasta was 20 Birr when the pandemic began and for most of 2020. However, now it costs 41 Birr in Addis Ababa market. The recent rise in the value of goods can be attributed to many factors including the devaluation of the country’s currency which caused the value of imported products to increase. A year ago $1 was worth 35 Birr, but now it is around 43 Birr. Another reason for the recent increase in the value of goods is the ongoing war in Tigray and the conflicts that are happening in different parts of the country. IMF’s analysis seems also to side with this. [11] More or less, Ethiopia tried to maintain its economy amidst difficult situations with the pandemic, the desert locust plague and the humanitarian crisis that is happening in the country following different conflicts, including the Tigray war. No wonder the government has the power to dissect and heal the economy as well as control most of the aspects of the livelihood of its citizens. This leads us to the final impact of the pandemic on Ethiopians. Impact on Politics COVID-19 has been the most politically abused disease. The political issues relating to the disease have been manifesting in many distinct ways. From the controversial international tension between China and the rest of the developed world, particularly the U.S.A, to the ways in which national and local politics in almost every country have been both affected by the pandemic and used it to fulfill political agendas. Ethiopia was no different. In August 29, 2020, Ethiopia had planned to conduct its sixth national and regional election. It was the most anticipated event in the country, which according to Jawar Mohammed, the politician turned media guru, could make or break the country. Jawar’s analysis could be an underestimation of the situation that would follow the election. At this stage it would be necessary to give a little background on the recent political climate of the country before the pandemic. Covid-19 safety billboard in front of a condominium in Addis AbabaPhoto by Medhanit A In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed Ali, the current Prime Minister of Ethiopia, rose to power through popular struggle that forced former Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn to resign. Abiy Ahmed represented the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Oromo faction of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary and Democratic Front (EPRDF). After he came to power Abiy Ahmed made huge promises, most of which were fulfilled by him or his administration subsequently. He released imprisoned political figures. He allowed exiled political parties and figures to return to the country. Most of all, he vowed to undergo a free and fair election. Ethiopia has seen five national elections since the downfall of the military junta in 1991. All five elections were described as not credible, free or fair by the participants. The most notable being the 2005 election in which it was concluded that the ruling party EPRDF, committed voter fraud. The Coalition for Unity and Democracy party (CUD, ‘Kinijit’ in Amharic) won the election in the capital by a large margin, but the ruling party was not willing to give up power. Hence, some leaders were thrown in jail while others were exiled. Abiy Ahmed vowed to reverse this history by preparing a free and fair election in 2020. Many political parties including the Ethiopian Citizen’s Social Justice Party (EZEMA), the National Movement of the Amhara (NAMA), the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Prosperity Party (the reformed ‘EPRDF’) were making preparations for the elections. However, Abiy Ahmed faced huge challenges ahead of the election. The first was from his constituency, the Oromo people, because of other competing political parties who were thought to be on track to comfortably win the election, while Abiy’s reformed ‘Prosperity Party’ did not seem to be favored by the Oromo people. Secondly, the TPLF were also preparing to make a comeback using a loophole after they were pushed from power following the ascension of Abiy Ahmed into the premiership. Thirdly, the rise of the Amhara nationalist parties such as the NAMA, increased the tension between the Amhara and the Oromo, the two largest ethnic groups in the country. Fourthly, Abiy’s Prosperity Party (PP) was immature and not well established and clearly needed some time until a true ideological unity was formed. All these challenges made the sixth national election highly anticipated on one hand, and haphazard on the other. After the first COVID-19 case was announced on March 13, 2020, political parties were warning of a possible postponement of the election if necessary preventive measures were not taken. The government on the other hand, weighed up the necessity of taking preventive measures rather than focusing on the election. However, the issue of postponing the election was not an easy matter. The country did not have a history of postponing national polls. Moreover, the constitution said nothing regarding the authority and assumption of the governing body in the period between the original election date and the date to which it was postponed. Hence, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) was established by the House of People’s Representatives (HPR). The Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) is a body of legal experts the HPR established to make recommendations on constitutional interpretation requests to the lower chamber of parliament, the House of Federation (HoF). The CCI made an unprecedented public announcement on May 11, inviting qualified experts to submit to the House of People’s Representatives (HoPR) written opinions regarding the interpretation of Article 54(1), Article 58 (3) and Article 93 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution), in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on the scheduled national election. Accordingly, many legal experts submitted their amicus curiae. [12] The submitted papers were presented to the CCI during a live broadcast. Different arguments were presented in the available time. However, with the election certainly postponed, none of the papers in support of an interim or transitional government ‘convinced’ the CCI. Hence, in May the sitting House of Representatives voted to postpone the election until 2021 and the House of Federation allowed the ruling government to continue in power until then. The ramifications of this decision is a huge topic of study on its own. As of the time of writing, the consequences of that decision is still not fully understood. Many political figures that were getting ready for the election a year ago including Jawar Mohammed and Eskendir Nega are now behind bars. The election is not as excitedly anticipated as it was a year ago. A billboard in Minnesota, USA, reads ‘Free Jawar Mohammed’ Meanwhile, it is also worth noting that Ethiopia was not the only country whose election was affected. According to IDEA, from February 2020 to June 2021 at least 78 countries and territories across the globe have decided to postpone national and subnational elections due to COVID-19, out of which at least 41 countries and territories have decided to postpone national elections and referendums, Ethiopia included. Hence, Ethiopia’s case is not unique. Despite the COVID-19 health education by the Ministry of Health, both the ruling party and other competing parties have held rallies and mass gatherings without the necessary COVID-19 protective measures. It seems Ethiopia has passed the COVID-19 season, living in a ‘post-pandemic’ state, although medical and other ongoing effects of the pandemic say otherwise. Naol Befkadu , MD, is a physician based in Addis Ababa. [1] Wuilbercq, E. (2020, May 4). Q&A: How Ethiopia’s health minister is preparing for coronavirus. Thomson Reuters Foundation. https://news.trust.org/item/20200504172943-5mjaz (accessed on June 7, 2021) [2] All covid-19 related data are taken from https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/ethiopia/ (accessed on June 7, 2021) [3] WHO Africa, 2020. https://www.afro.who.int/news/ethiopia-introduces-covid-19-vaccine-national-launching-ceremony (accessed on June 7, 2021) [4] Ethiopia announced that it found traditional medicine for covid 19. Capital News. (2020, March 27) https://www.capitalethiopia.com/capital/ethiopia-announced-that-it-found-traditional-medicine-for-covid-19/ (accessed on June 7, 2021) [5] Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey, 2016. [6] International Journal of Gender and Women’s Studies June 2015, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 42-50 ISSN: 2333-6021 (Print), 2333-603X (Online) Copyright © The Author(s). All Rights Reserved. Published by American Research Institute for Policy Development [7] “Sex workers: Population size estimate (2016, November). UNAIDS. http://www.aidsinfoonline.org/ (accessed on June 7, 2021) [8] Wuilbercq, E. (2021, March 3). Thomson Reuters Foundation. FEATURE-Ethiopia’s migrants turn to sex work as pandemic sends them home. (accessed on June 7, 2021) [9] International Monetary Fund: The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: IMF Country Report No. 18/354 [10] United Nations Ethiopia: One UN Assessment: Socio-Economic Impact of Covid-19 in Ethiopia. May 2020, Addis Ababa. [11] International Monetary Fund: The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: IMF Country Report No. 18/354 [12] Kidanemariam, Mulu & Ghebregergs, Mehreteab & Hadush, Gebrehiwot & Hailu, Gebremeskel & Messele, Abraha & Weldeselassie, Gebreabeggi. (2020). Amicus Curiae on Election, COVID-19, and Constitutional Interpretation in Ethiopia (May 15, 2020). Previous Next

Robert Bobnic and Kaja Kraner < Back cosmotechnics, modernity, RTB Bor, (data) mining, computer history, self-managing socialism Robert Bobnic and Kaja Kraner Previous Next

< Back Infrastructuring the Region: Fieldnotes of an Ongoing Research 26 Nov 2020 Jelica Jovanović Infrastructure is often described in terms of the (non)presence and physicality of pipes and routes – those grand linear structures of spatial and resource connectivity: highways, railways, sewage, heating, aqueducts. These structures often go either below or along the very surface of the ground. But to look beyond the narrow, technical definition of infrastructural thought in engineering classes, infrastructure can also be a network of buildings such as health centers, schools, green markets, and similar amenities which make everyday life possible, and are often the embodiment of (what should be) the social policy and/or safety net. However, the relational and temporal aspects of the infrastructure are much more interesting, especially in case of Serbia, whose economy is going through its third decade of restructuring and shrinking, rooted in a transition from a socialist to capitalist economy. It goes hand in hand with privatization of most of the industry, public property, and services. Infrastructure(s) are the latest large-size serving on the privatization plate of Serbia, with many concessions given and many foreign loans taken, for the reconstruction of existing [infrastructure], and the construction of the new ones. Furthermore, most of the viable state-owned companies have been sold, leaving the [country’s] resources as the next major stop for privatization – there are many foreign companies currently taking over the mines and quarries, or undertaking explorations of potential mines all over the country. The next step of the research will further expand why these resources and companies are important for the economy of Serbia, and their historical role in the 20th and 21st century. But for now, let’s focus on the recent concessions and privatizations in Serbia that involve the partners from PR China. Within the last three years, as the Belt and Road initiative was announced (and is already beginning to materialise), Chinese companies have appeared to be quite interested in the country’s greatest pieces of industry and traffic infrastructure, which – due to their size – have also accumulated significant debt, and lags behind contemporary practices [1] . However, it is interesting to compare the present-day strategy of Chinese companies with the historical strategies and goals of the post-war renewal and reorganization of the Yugoslav economy, since the same companies are at the centre of both of those processes. In December 2019, the exhibition Serbia 2019 – the year of infrastructure: Nothing is far away anymore was opened in the Palace of Serbia by the highest state and government officials. The exhibition is praising many of the ongoing and planned traffic infrastructural investments in Serbia, the most substantial and expensive ones being financed with loans from the government of the People’s Republic of China. Half an hour for a journey between Novi Sad and Belgrade is allegedly expected to already happen by September 2021 – this would be a step up from the usual hour and a half (or more) the journey currently takes, as malfunctions stand as the usual occurrence. The same goes for the railways towards Niš and the southern border of Serbia. The announced driving speed should be around 200km/h (which would be faster than the highway) meaning that the travel time would be around 2 hours instead of over 4. Both routes of the railway will be reconstructed by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and is scheduled to start in 2021. The appearance of Chinese companies in Serbia – and other Balkan countries for that matter – raised some brows. Serbia is a small country, classified as upper middle income by the World bank, but with quite a high public debt, reaching up to more than 50% of the nation’s GDP [2] . Serbia is therefore maintaining good relations with foreign diplomatic representatives, and seeking economic collaboration from all over the world, diversifying its sources of investments and loans. Serbia is even reviving some old alliances/friendships from the period of Non-Aligned Yugoslavia – which is often problematic from the perspective of the European Union (EU), due to the country’s proclaimed accession to the Union. Meanwhile, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is loaning money to Srbija voz to purchase new locomotives “as a part of [the] transition to [a] green economy”, while the World Bank gave a loan to finish the E75 highway. An agreement has also been signed with the Russian company, RZD International , for the reconstruction of the railway to Bar in Montenegro, with an estimated deadline for the documentation preparation of the remaining 200km somewhere vaguely in 2021. In December 2019, Serbia Cargo started transporting cargo from the Port of Bar in Montenegro to ZiJin in Bor, Serbia. ZiJin Mining is a multinational mining group situated in China, which purchased 63% of the stocks of the Mining and Smelting Basin Bor (RTB Bor) in 2019, establishing a joint-stock company, Serbia Zijin Copper Doo Bor, for a period of 30 years. Apparently, this shipment from Montenegro was the first shipment (of many to come) of copper ore imported from Spain. At the moment, it is unclear whether the Montenegrin authorities will proceed with the planned privatization of the Port Bar [3] . Maybe China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) will step into the game, as many analysts have estimated, to secure the access to another Mediterranean port, as it is already the major stockholder of the Piraeus Port in Greece. The construction of the railroad through Serbia begun in the mid-19th century. It was the first major piece of infrastructure built in this small Balkan state. According to the Treaty signed during the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Serbia, among other countries, had agreed to build the railroad from Belgrade to the town of Vranje on the southern border as a part of the route connecting Central Europe with the Middle East. The first ceremonial train of the Belgrade-Niš line departed on September 4, 1884. Regular traffic on this route began on September 15, 1884, and Serbian Railways celebrate that day every year as Railway Day [4] . Even today, this is Serbia’s main traffic corridor, which remains the most vital transportation route of the country, enforced by the much later addition and integration into the highway E-75/Corridor 10 system, which connects the north and south of Europe. This corridor goes from Vardø in Finland’s north to the Sitia port in the south of Greece, connecting many other towns and cities along the way: Helsinki, Gdansk, Katowice, Bratislava, Budapest, Belgrade, Skopje, Thessaloniki, and Athens [5] . However, not everyone is as enthusiastic: “Soon, that railroad will be the only thing left in Serbia,” was one of many comments below an article reporting on the fast tracks from Belgrade to Novi Sad, testifying to a sense of disenfranchisement felt by the citizens of Serbia because – the way they see it – the “family silverware” is being sold off as the country continues to become more and more indebted. This railroad (together with the highway E75) is a part of Pan-European Corridor 10, which connects European north and south, from Finland to Greece, and is being restored by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) – some of it for the first time in 70 years. Some of the train stations are also being refreshed with new wall paint, railings, furniture, and pavement. Furthermore, there are other reasons for the concern, but mainly regarding the way local authorities are handling the situation. Impeding the implementation of the reconstruction project, all the unresolved problems that have accumulated over decades are being too hastily dealt with, causing other problems in the long run. For example, independent organizations dealing with the right to housing and challenging evictions, have recently raised the issue of the displacement of the railways’ workers who were given the accommodation in the railway guards, along the railway line from Zemun Polje to Batajnica [6] . The actors of this entire process is former Serbian Railways public company, which now has split jurisdiction with the newly founded companies, who paradoxically, are all in the same building: Serbian Railways, Infrastructure of Railways Serbia, Serbia Cargo, Museum of Railways, Traffic Institute CIP – but it seems that there is no communication between them. Furthermore, all these entities are public property, answering to the Government of Serbia. The havoc caused on the sites of railway reconstruction in Serbia testifies to the disorganization and lack of communication between these (public) entities. 11 families in 35m2, a report by the activists of ZA Krov nad glavom (FOR the Roof Above Our Heads) organization. The families living near the railway that is being reconstructed are forced to move, without the state providing a replacement housing. Source: https://youtu.be/2Yz-gZ9aU_A Main railway station in Bor 2020. Credit: Jelica Jovanović Main railway station in Bor circa 1980s. Courtesy National library Bor Road to Zaječar via Metovnica village, circa 1960. Courtesy National library Bor A look towards the east of the country further complicates the picture. In stark contrast to the images of the Corridor 10 reconstruction are the haunting images of the empty train station in Bor. The last scheduled train departed from Bor train station on December 14th 2019, according to the schedule still hanging on the station’s walls. The railroad is working just fine and is still being used, but only for cargo trains, not passengers. The industrial railroad in Bor had already been dismantled a few years ago, with only one branch still in use within the Mining and Smelting Basin Bor, today known as Serbia Zijin Copper Doo Bor. The question of railroad construction in Eastern Serbia has always been a pressing matter for all the governments of Serbia/Yugoslavia, but most especially came to the fore in the second half of 19th century, to address the issue of connecting with the rest of the country via central route between Belgrade and Niš, when the road network to this area was too ineffective to meet the needs of the country. The ore extraction was the primary motif for the railroad construction in this region. Eastern Serbia, especially the Timok region, is very rich in mineral resources, as well as in agricultural products, which were necessary to boost the country’s economy that was always struggling with various crises. These respective industries have been considered a main branch of the economy since independence from the Ottoman empire. In 1899, the government decided to sign a contract with some local entrepreneurs to build the railroad Paraćin-Zaječar. Due to the subsequent crisis regarding the parliament dismissal and a coup d’état, the beginning of the process was delayed until 1904. Although with many difficulties, especially since the terrain is very hilly and therefore difficult to build, the railroad was eventually finished and opened on January 1, 1911. Given the experience with Customs War/Pig War 1906-1908, Serbia was pushing for the construction of the railroads to ease itself from its dependence on the Austro-Hungarian empire. One of the results of this trade war was the development of the mining industry in Serbia – which then needed more ore, which came mostly from Eastern Serbia – and an effort to connect with the Thessaloniki port. However, this port was not entirely at the country’s disposal due to the influence of the court in Vienna, and Serbia consequently pushed for the construction of the more important Trans-Balkan railroad route along the Kladovo-Niš-Adriatic coast. As a part of this route, the railroad from Zaječar to Negotin was built, and by February 1914, it expanded further to Prahovo and the Port on Danube, as well as from Zaječar to Knjaževac by February 1915. These railroads further networked the region of Eastern Serbia, from which coal, iron, copper, and gold ore were being extracted [7] . There have been several attempts to build more railroads in the more mountainous areas of Kučaj, which is also the area richest in gold, iron, and timber. A group of local merchants applied and got an approval of concession to build the railroad between Veliko Gradište on the Danube and Majdanpek, probably expecting that as concessionaries, it would also be easier for them to trade goods and raw materials if they had direct access to the port on the Danube. However, as it often happens, they overestimated their abilities and underestimated the challenges of the terrain and local microclimate. This railroad was never built [8] . Another very ambitious route that eventually was not finished as planned was the route Bor-Crni Vrh. The route was built under very peculiar circumstances: during the occupation by Nazi Germany, when the forced labour camp was established in Bor. Besides working in the mine, the prisoners were also building the route of the railroad from Bor to Crni Vrh, with the goal of easier extraction and transport of the timber and charcoal, and eventual continuation of the route to the town of Žagubica. The railroad was used as an industrial railroad with no travellers, but the problem with it was that it was built so poorly that accidents were constantly occurring. It was damaged before the retreat of the Nazi army – hence once the occupation was over in 1944, the first task that youth brigades had was to reconstruct this railroad. Within that year, the route was already partially in use, and by the summer of 1945, was finally completed and given to the Basin in Bor as an industrial railroad. It operated until 1968, when the need for it (and many other routes) ceased to exist, as motorways were in the process of being built [9] . Today, only this route remains, with its rails removed, now used as a hiking trail. The route of the former railroad to Crni Vrh. Credit: Jelica Jovanović, October 2020. Bor was one of the most important cities of the post-WW2 period in former Yugoslavia, precisely because of its material base: the copper mine. The town achieved the status of being a city in 1947 in order to establish the city’s status within the region, the republic, and the federation, as well as to give it the proper administrative basis for its future development. The copper served as one of the bases for the industrialization and electrification of the country, as well as lifting the population out of poverty. Copper mining and the expansion of copper production (as well as the other by-products, which are then further connected with other industries as the basis/resources for their production) were connected with the development of the city of Bor, as well as the development of the entire region and many other cities all over Serbia and into Yugoslavia. Within the broader region: Majdanpek, Zaječar, Boljevac, Kladovo, Negotin, Donji Milanovac, Prokuplje, Žagubica; within the Republic of Serbia: Novi Sad, Pančevo, Sevojno (near Užice), Jagodina; within Yugoslavia: Zagreb. The city’s mono-industry had essentially been under the auspices and control of the federal government from the very beginning of the socialist economy of Yugoslavia – even excluded to a certain degree from the framework of workers’ self-management, which was the official state polity [10] . Today, it feels that Bor, together with Serbia, has yet again found itself in a position similar to where it was a century (or at least 70 years) ago: deindustrialized, and reliant on direct foreign investments and foreign concessions to reconstruct its infrastructures and major industries. At the moment, nobody knows for certain what the terms of contract are in case of the railway reconstruction – or many other contracts as a matter of fact – and the general assumption is that they are unfavourable for Serbia, or else there would be no reason for confidentiality [11] . To help facilitate the process of direct bargaining with foreign creditors/investors, the government even pushed through parliament the Law on Special Procedures for the Implementation of the Project of Construction and Reconstruction of Line Infrastructure Structures of Particular Importance to the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette of RS, number 9 from 04 February 2020). This law is targeting the so-called projects of construction and reconstruction of line infrastructure structures of particular importance to the Republic of Serbia – railways, highways, possibly the Belgrade metro – which are all currently being built with money given by foreign creditors, who in turn also bypass the local rules and laws on bidding, and directly negotiate for the companies from their countries of origin to come and build in Serbia. Meanwhile, the local construction companies have been ravaged by years of mismanagement and scandalously organized privatization. Hence the concern on how the debt will be repaid if the local industry is disappearing. However, very recent news show that China had started to suspend the debt for African countries, which in comparison to the usual money lenders, makes them a more desirable [business] partner, especially to the impoverished countries of the global South. [12] Although the contexts are different, maybe there is some room for renegotiating the terms of contracts in Serbia. In one of his lectures, Yanis Varoufakis reflects on his experience with the concession of the Pireaus Port, and states that there is a difference in the agendas of Western capital compared to Chinese capital entering foreign markets (being non-imperialistic/or less imperialistic), especially within the countries on the periphery of capitalism and the Global South like Ethiopia and Greece. [13] Serbia is in position very similar to these countries and it will be interesting to see how the situation will develop in the years to come. Jelica Jovanović is an architect and PhD student at the University of Technology in Vienna, working as an independent researcher. [1] Slobodna Evropa: „Kinesko čudo na Balkanu“ [A Chinese miracle in the Balkans] https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30325861.html?utm_source=Balkan-HP-2col&utm_medium=banner&utm_campaign=China-vs-Balkans , accessed November 16th 2020 [2] World Bank: Economy Profile of Serbia Doing Business 2020 Indicators, p.3, https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/serbia/SRB.pdf , accessed November 16th 2020; Ministarstvo finansija RS: Javni dug Srbije, p.5, http://www.javnidug.gov.rs/upload/Stanje%20i%20struktura%20za%20mesecni%20izvestaj%20o%20stanju/31.12.2018%20final/Web%20site%20debt%20report%20%20-%20SRB%20LATINICA%20decenbar%20gotov.pdf , accessed November 17th 2020 [3] “Mihajlovićeva i Belozjorov potpisali sporazum o obnovi barske pruge do granice sa Crnom Gorom” [Mihajlovic and Belozjorov signed an agreement on recostruction of the Bar railway to the border with Montenegro],” Bilten, December 2019 – January 2020, p.3, http://www.zeleznicesrbije.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/bilten-decembar-januar-2020.pdf , accessed November 15, 2020Aila Stojkobivić, “ARTICLE TITLE (SERBIAN)/(ENGLISH),” Bilten, September 2020, PAGE NUMBER http://www.zeleznicesrbije.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/bilten-septembar-2020.pdf [4] Serbian Railways. History of Serbian Railways. http://www.zeleznicesrbije.com/istorijat/?lang=lat [5] Economic Commission for Europe. International E Road Network. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/conventn/MapAGR2007.pdf , accessed November 15, 2020 [6] The brief report says: „…for a couple of months now, they have been exposed to pressure, attempts to cut off electricity, which they regularly pay for, as well as various forms of intimidation. Other families also received eviction orders, or were informally approached with such requests. In addition, all families have been living here for decades on the basis of a legally acquired right to use the accommodation, because their family members have spent their entire working life working for the railway and investing in its housing stock, as well as in the houses in which they lived. They do not want to move out until they are provided with adequate housing replacement, as required by the law. Everyone was offered the same thing: a smaller space in Topcider.“ ZA krov nad glavom: 11 porodica u 35 kvadrata, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Yz-gZ9aU_A&feature=youtu.be , accessed November 17, 2020 [7] Nikolić, Jezdimir S.: Istorija železnica Srbije, Vojvodine, Crne Gore i Kosova, p. 157-162 [8] Ibid, p.163-164 [9] Radomir Cokić, B.Sc. eng. Forty years since the construction of the first youth railway Bor-Crni Vrh. http://timockapruga.org.rs/istorija_timockih_pruga/bor_crni_vrh.php , accessed Novemner 15, 2020 [10] Jovanović, Jelica: EMERGING FROM THE ORE: BOR, A NEW CITY OF YUGOSLAVIA (manuscript for the catalog of the Pavilion of Serbia on 17th International Architecture Exhibition – Biennale in Venice) [11] Zorić, Ognjen: “Oznaka ‘Poverljivo’ – zašto tajnost prati ugovore koje sklapa Srbija?” [Label ‘Confidential’ – why does secrecy follow contracts concluded by Serbia?], https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/poverljivi-ugovori/30739667.html , accessed November 16th 2020 [12] Jevans Nyabiage: Chinese bank signs debt suspension deals with 11 African countries, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3105290/chinese-bank-signs-debt-suspension-deals-11-african-countries , accessed November 17, 2020 [13] China vs EU on debt conditions. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tJatdtv4jQ&feature=emb_logo , accessed November 15, 2020 Previous Next

Events Lecture Series Participant Activities Lecture by Ivet Ćurlin / WHW / My Sweet Little Lamb, (everything we see can also be otherwise) Saša Tkačenko, Flags from WCSCD series, 2018 THE CURATORIAL COURSE WHAT COULD/SHOULD CURATING DO? IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE A PUBLIC TALK BY: IVET ĆURLIN (WHW) My Sweet Little Lamb, (everything we see can also be otherwise) MUSEUM OF CONTEMPORARY ART BELGRADE THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8 2018 AT 6 PM In collaboration with the Museum of Contemporary Art Belgrade, the lecture within the series of public programs organized by WCSCD will be presented by Ivet Ćurlin — member of curatorial collective, What, How & for Whom/WHW. The series is designed to offer new and different perspectives on the theories and practices of exhibition-making. Lecture by Ivet Ćurlin entitled “My Sweet Little Lamb, (everything we see can also be otherwise)” will present the work of curatorial collective WHW through several curatorial projects concerned with continuous reconfiguration of the relationships between artistic and cultural production, authorship, collecting, history, display and politics, as well as the discuss the need for starting the new long-term educational program for young artists, called WHW Akademija. The focus will be the project My Sweet Little Lamb, (everything we see can also be otherwise) WHW co-curated in collaboration with Kathrin Rhomberg. After six exhibition episodes, taking place from November 2016 to May 2017 in independent art spaces, artists’ studios and private apartments in Zagreb, the project’s epilogue has been staged at The Showroom, London, in collaboration with Emily Pethick. Based on the Kontakt Art Collection, which includes seminal works by artists from Central, Eastern and South-East Europe from 1960s to the present, the project juxtaposed the collection’s canonical works with a number of historical and contemporary works in order to address and reframe some of the recurring themes that stem from the collection, such as radical utopianism, figure of dissident artist, questions of gendered bodies, political subjectivities and engagement, and the status of public space. Titled after a work by Croatian artist Mladen Stilinović (1947-2016), the project is inspired by his life-long anti-systematic artistic approach that searched for more autonomous ways of artistic production. His artistic practice that humorously engages with complex themes of ideology, work, money, pain and poverty, inspired many of WHW’s projects. ABOUT THE LECTURER: Ivet Ćurlin is member of curatorial collective, What, How & for Whom/WHW, formed in 1999 and based in Zagreb and Berlin. Besides Ivet, WHW’s members are curators Ana Dević, Nataša Ilić and Sabina Sabolović, and designer and publicist Dejan Kršić. WHW organizes a range of production, exhibitions and publishing projects and directs Gallery Nova in Zagreb. Since its first exhibition titled What, How & for Whom, on the occasion of 152nd anniversary of the Communist Manifesto, that took place in Zagreb in 2000, WHW curated numerous international projects, among which are Collective Creativity, Kunsthalle Fridericianum, Kassel, 2005; 11th Istanbul Biennial What Keeps Mankind Alive?, Istanbul, 2009; One Needs to Live Self-Confidently…Watching, Croatian pavilion at 54th Venice Biennial, 2011. Recent projects by WHW include exhibition Really Useful Knowledge, Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia, Madrid, 2014, My Sweet Little Lamb, (everything we see can also be otherwise), (co-curated with Kathrin Rhomberg), various locations in Zagreb, 2016/2017; Shadow Citizens, retrospective of Želimir Žilnik at Edith-Russ-Hausfür Medienkunst, Oldenburg, 2018, and On the Shoulders of Fallen Giants, The 2nd Industrial Art Biennial that took place this summer in Labin, Raša, Rijeka, Pula, Vodnjan. In fall 2018, WHW has started non-formal international educational program for young artists in Zagreb, called WHW Akademija. The WCSCD curatorial course and series of public lectures are initiated and organized by Biljana Ciric together with Supervizuelna. The lecture by Niels Van Tomme is made possible with the help of MoCAB and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with the additional support of Zepter Museum and Zepter Hotel. Project partners: The Museum of Contemporary Art Belgrade; GRAD—European Center for Culture and Debate; EVA International – Ireland’s Biennial, ’Novi Sad 2021 – European Capital of Culture’ Foundation and Zepter Museum. The project is supported by: the Goethe Institute in Belgrade; Istituto Italiano di Cultura Belgrado; the Embassy of Sweden; the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the Embassy of Ireland in Greece; the Embassy of Indonesia; the EU Info Centre; Pro Helvetia – Swiss Art Council; and galleries Eugster || Belgrade, HESTIA Art Residency & Exhibitions Bureau, and Zepter Hotel, Royal Inn Hotel and CAR:GO. Media partners: EUNIC Serbia, RTS3. < Mentors Educational Program How to Apply >

Call for applications: “WHAT COULD/SHOULD CURATING DO?” curatorial course 2019 We are pleased to announce the second edition of the curatorial program, What Could/Should Curating Do?, hosted in the city of Belgrade. August 26–November 26, 2019 Application deadline: March 18 What Could/Should Curating Do? Belgrade, Serbia WCSCD was launched in 2018 as an international curatorial course situated in a specific, local context framed by its Post-Yugoslav identity, the Balkans. After the inaugural pilot year program, we continue to contribute to the thinking and doing around the curatorial field with an intense, three-month long program that draws upon the unique local and regional context as a critical source of knowledge. Simultaneously, this program also intends to provide insights into the wider international framework related to exhibition-making practices on both a theoretical and practical level. The curriculum for the course includes weekly writing assignments, presentations, studio visits, institutional visits, lectures, and mentoring sessions with local and international practitioners. As part of the program for 2019 a research visit to a different part of the Balkan region is also being planned. During the course, participants will develop and propose a collective exhibition project that will be presented the last month of the program—or later—depending on the nature of the project. The course offers participants the opportunity to meet and learn from many leading professionals in the field of contemporary curating. The primary mentors for the course include Luca Lo Pinto (Kunshtalle Wien, Vienna); Charles Esche (Van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven); Zdenka Badovinac (Moderna Galerija, Ljubljana); Nikita Yingqian Cai (Times Museum, Guangzhou); Ares Shporta (Lumbardhi Foundation, Prizren); Dan Cameron (New York); Matt Packer (EVA International, Limerick); Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev (Castello di Rivoli, Turin); and others. Patrick D. Flores, Artistic Director of the 2019 Singapore Biennial will give a kick-off lecture in May of 2019, titled Singapore Biennial 2019: Some Political Inspirations. The presentation speaks to the method and conceptual impulse to convene a biennial in Singapore, noting the lively milieu of contemporary art in Southeast Asia and the ethical demands involved in evoking this liveliness. Application requirements: Applicants must be 35 years of age or younger No prior degrees in art or art history are required The course fee is 350 EUR. The fee does not include accommodations or travel costs. International participants will be assisted with finding accommodations in Belgrade—accommodations are approximately 180 EUR per month. The standard course fee also does not cover travel and accommodations on research trips. Successful applicants should prepare an allowance of approximately 300 EUR to cover these additional costs. How to apply: Applications should include the following items as a single Word or PDF document, sent by email to what.could.curating.do@gmail.com with the subject line: Curatorial-Course-Belgrade by March 18, 2019: CV/Portfolio Letter of Interest (500 words maximum, explaining your interest in curatorial practices) Project Description (300 words maximum, an urgent project you would like to develop) Based on the quality of the submitted documents, 15 participants will be selected to attend the course. Selected applicants should plan to arrive in Belgrade no later than August 25, 2019. The final list of participants will be announced in May 2019. The final curriculum of the program will be confirmed in June 2019 and shared with the attending curators at that time. The WCSCD curatorial course is a long term project initiated by Biljana Ćirić, with the support and collaboration of the following partner institutions: The Museum of Contemporary Art Belgrade; EVA International—Ireland’s Biennial of Contemporary Art; and Zepter Museum, among others. The project is supported by the Istituto Italiano di Cultura Belgrado; the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Belgrade; the Austrian Cultural Forum; Heinrich Boell Stiftung; and Hestia Art Residency & Exhibitions Bureau among others. Project contacts: what.could.curating.do@gmail.com Tjaša Pogačar (tutor of WCSCD 2019): pogacartjasa.contact@gmail.com Ana Anakijev (coordinator): anaanakijev@gmail.com Visual identity by Saša Tkačenko

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Madina Gasimi < Back Untitled Madina Gasimi When I finish my essay, I will become obsolete for the world. This is a joke that becomes the truth and concerns literally everyone. I am not able objectively to discuss self-isolation and the global consequences of a pandemic. I am not a politician, I’m a curator and most of the time I work at home. It’s kind of an isolation, but it’s a freewill. In this essay I try my best to describe my thoughts on the situation after the pandemic of COVID-19. There is an epidemic storm in Europe and the USA, and it is growing in Russia. Many people, among them my friends, believe that COVID-19 is harmless and there are different conspiracy theories that say it is built to destroy the economic system of the whole world. But the majority is still afraid to get sick and die. Then I have a question. What is the main problem revealed with the start of the pandemic? Is it a fear of death? But it’s not a problem, it is a primal feeling we always have, and it escalates in individual cases. I think that the main problem concerns the changes in relationships between people, and these changes are affected by fear. Fear to die, fear to get sick, fear to lose a job, fear to become vain. Different kinds of fear between people have become a driving force. The virus has changed our relationships and is changing the planet. In the face of a disease whose origin still causes controversy, globalization has proven powerless. Coronavirus gives a chance to individual nation-states and is a catalyst for the birth of dictatorship. For example, the state of emergency introduced in one of the European countries provided the current Prime Minister with almost unlimited power, which could lead to restrictions on freedoms and human rights. Let’s see what has already happened with freedom and human rights. I could never imagine such a thing, but the people of Europe instantly and voluntarily gave up their rights and freedoms in the face of an unknown disease and obvious danger. Museums, theatres, restaurants, cinemas, parks are closed, people are self-isolated and are waiting for the vaccine. In Moscow people only can go outside on passes and no further than 100 meters from the house, and they pay fines if they break their self-isolation. There is a new reality in which there is a coronavirus. People of the whole entire world are not used to living in a new reality. This is the reality where familiar and favourite places (bars, restaurants, cinemas, museums) have turned into places that can cause COVID 19 and therefore kill people. The urban environment is collapsing, and our usual way of life has crushed. It’s amazing how people reacted to this. What is happening now looks like a dystopia. It seems like people have thrown away several centuries of cultural development, locked themselves in their houses, have given all their rights, and are waiting good times. This is a manifestation of animal fear of an unknown infection, the symptoms and parameters of which change in the media every day. I am happy being alive and healthy. I appreciate free time that has appeared, I spend it with my family and, surprisingly, to work more. I am happy to see all the people who support the doctors, who are the true heroes of our time. If people still can help each other, then nothing is lost. But I think we should not forget the one thing. If we want to remain human beings and save mankind, one day we will have to open the borders, go to theaters again, shake hands and make friends. The one who first removes the mask after the quarantine is finished, and open the doors to other people, will be a hero. We just have to survive! It’s hard for me to imagine what activities will be void or unnecessary. We observe that digital support has appeared in every realm. It turns out that you don’t need to go to the office 5 days per week in order to work well, you have an ability to work directly from home, and it turns out that if you are a responsible one your efficiency is bigger. Utility and optimization are becoming the main characteristics of the work, regardless who you are – a programmer or a methodologist in a museum. We are fully transitioning to online life. Digital is possible everywhere, but should it be everywhere? Where, for example, will the Tretyakov Gallery collection go after it is digitized? Will offline museum occupations become online, and will other museum offline ones be excluded? That is the question. Perhaps after the pandemic people who create content will be included in the system, competing for the attention because the attention will finally turn into a new currency in the world. People will sit at home and watch Netflix, and screenwriters will tirelessly come up with new stories. People will be able to visit the museums not leaving their homes. There are online exhibitions curated online by online curators. And you absolutely do not need to make physical contact with anyone. Sounds weird, doesn’t it? Honestly I am not worried what should I do as a curator when it’s over. A curator is a person who creates ideas and meanings, a curator can form an agenda for today. I’m sure the curator can do anything and work in existing circumstances. I am concerned more about the issue of how homeless people, people with disabilities stay alive against the virus, how the environment will develop for such people, what will happen with palliative care? So many questions, and so few answers. We live in interesting times, and only those people who are able to change and adapt will survive. We are now united in the struggle for life, but we have forgotten that dying and disappearing is normal. I would like to recall the concept of Timothy Morton: the world changes regardless of how a person wants to see it. We should not fear such uncertainty, but it should be perceived as something positive. No one knows what is going to happen next, but arts and culture always rise up after every major epidemic. Madina Gasimi is a curator and cultural project manager based in Moscow, Russia. Previous Next

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